我是制度经济学的外行，今天自己预计的金融学领域的获奖者没有被“选中”，稍稍有些失望。但是，至少从“局外人”的视角里对这次评价结果“意识”到的是：这次获奖与其说是这两位学者在“方法论”上的突破而得到了褒奖，还不如说是因为“符合”时代的“价值观”让其研究成果更添色彩而使其在众多“大家”候选人当中脱颖而出；因为他们的理论再次向我们展示了“市场并非万能”的道理，“制度”的安排“质量”（从这个意义上讲，今天 两位学者揭开了市场资源配置的“黑箱子”，指出亚当斯密在揭示“看不见手”功能中所存在的“局限性”）会给社会带来不可忽略的“负外部性”（比如，产权界 定不明确的制度会增加的经济运营的“交易成本”），尤其是女性获奖者Elinor Ostrom所代表的“新制度经济学派”研究观点触及到了人类社会如何应对公共资源被“滥用”和“破坏”的问题，而且，这个问题在纯粹市场“经济利益”驱 动的情况下会变得越来越糟糕，作为公共资源的管理者——政府应该充当怎样的角色会关系到市场运行的好与坏。这类思想对我们今天思考“后危机时代”的增长模 式提供了很好的价值观和政策安排的目标选择。
另外，我也在想，最近热门起来的“环境经济学”和“能源经济学”这类应用学科今天终于找到了厚实的“理论基础”，今后，他们会随着大家对公共资源保护意识的提高而会越来越被大家所“尊重”。不管怎样，2009年诺贝尔经济学奖的获得者的学术贡献是经过长时间“考验”的（这是这个奖的一大特色），尽管“新古典经济学派”今后还会对这两个代表“新凯恩斯学派”的学者发起新一轮的“学术挑战”（这也是经济学永远年轻的魅力所在），但是，诺贝尔经济学奖，至少不会出现像奥巴马那样“火箭式”的当选的局面——这让不少人对“和平奖”的分量产生了极大的“怀疑”。
最后，为了让更多人了解这次获奖者的学术贡献，我这里粘贴了一部分我的研究生整理的材料，供大家参考：
一、 本届获奖理由：
Elinor Ostrom：
她的提名辞："for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons"
Elinor Ostrom的获奖理由是对经济管理的研究，特别是在公共选择方面的研究，她的研究证明了用户组织（user associations）如何成功管理公共财产。在下面《差别与贡献》一部分比较详细介绍了二人的观点。
Oliver E. Williamson
他的提名辞"for his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm"
奥利弗·E·威廉姆森因对制度经济学的研究（特别是在企业边界方面的研究）而获得2009年诺贝尔经济学奖。他的理论显示，企业能够扮演解决冲突的角色。
二、 获奖者简介：
Elinor Ostrom（1933-）*，印第安那大学政治学系阿瑟·本特利讲座教授，该校伯明顿分校(Indiana University Bloomington)政治理论与政策分析研究所(Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis)联席所长，制度、人口与环境变迁研究中心共同主任。她对制度分析理论、集体行动理论、可持续发展、公共资源等领域的研究在全世界范围内产生了很大的影响，并因而获得了众多的荣誉。她曾任美国政治学会、中西部政治学会、公共选择学会、国际共有财产研究学会等组织的会长，当选为美国艺术与科学院院士和国家科学院院士，获得著名的弗兰克·塞德曼政治经济学奖和约翰·斯凯特政治学奖，并被密歇根大学、瑞士苏黎世大学、荷兰社会研究院等授予名誉博士学位。她曾任或现任众多杂志的编委，包括美国政治学评论》、《美国政治学杂志》、《理论政治学杂志》、《制度经济学杂志》、《社会科学季刊》等。
她的研究强调人类和生态系统如何相互影响，从而提供可持续的长期使用资源的方式。*Ostrom也是第一位获得诺贝尔经济学奖的女性。
Oliver E. Williamson（1932.9.27—），“新制度经济学”的命名者*，被誉为重新发现“科斯定理”的人，至少是由于他的宣传功劳，才使科斯的交易费用学说成为现代经济学中异军突起的一派，并汇聚了包括组织理论、法学、经济学在内的大量学科交叉和学术创新，逐步发展成当代经济学的一个新的分支。“新制度经济学”就是威廉姆森对这一新分支的命名。
过去三十年，艾利诺-奥斯特若姆和奥利弗·E·威廉姆森的研究促使经济管理从经济学边缘研究成为前沿研究。
Oliver E. Williamson也是2008年度《经济评论》选出的07年杰出院士*。
三、获奖者研究领域前人的介绍：
前面提到williamson是当代新制度经济学的命名人。它已完全不同于传统的以凡勃仑、康芒斯、加尔布雷斯等人为代表的制度经济学*。它是以制度经济学方法研究制度，因此能被当代主流经济学派所接纳的新领域。此分支的启蒙者高斯本人荣获1991年度的诺贝尔经济学奖。继他之后；道格拉斯·诺思也戴上诺贝尔经济学奖的桂冠，不仅肯定了新制度经济学的学术地位，而且显示了当代经济学与其他社会科学学科交叉和融合的强大生命力。
政治经济学领域已经获过一次奖了，就是布坎纳在1986年获奖*，他是政治经济学的代表人物，也是公共选择理论的代表人物。实际上Ostrom也是跟着他的路线走过来的。
制度经济学方面06年讲拍卖，07年是制度设计，哈尔维斯，马斯汀（音），他们用术语的方法研究怎样设计一个很好的体制来避免一些冲突，存在经济学的办法，用博弈的办法、数学的办法来研究*。
四、差别与贡献
这次获奖的Elinor Ostrom与Oliver E. Williamson每人各平分得奖金的50%。二人研究的中心均为经济治理结构（制度安排）问题。但是二人的着眼点不同。Elinor Ostrom是政治学家，其研究的焦点集中在公共资源的经济治理，比如国家对于国有公共资源产权的划分，“公地悲剧”等。而Oliver E. Williamson的研究着眼于将产权理论应用于企业治理结构中，例如内部权力划分界限，企业间产权划分边界等问题。
相对于前人的研究，二人的贡献可以总结为 发展、推广 四个字。科斯定理最先提出实在19世纪60年代，williamson等人在80年代即组织了大量学者进行研讨，出版了大量论文著作，推广了科斯的深刻的洞见，将其从几句几篇简洁的论点扩展成规模颇大的学派。使人们看待产权问题时有了新的视角，更重要的是提供给人们一套系统而清晰的思考模式。
从时间的纵向来看，可以说科斯打开了制度经济学分析的大门，而诺斯、福格尔等人用历史研究的方法，即引用大量经济史料考察了经济制度发展和创新的过程*。而作为集大成者的Ostrom、Williamson等人则全面发展了新制度经济学的内涵，具体研究了在宏观和微观层面上权力的划分与规制这一重要问题。
Elinor Ostrom
Elinor Ostrom (born 1933) is an American political scientist. She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons".[1] She is the first woman to win the prize in this category. She is also the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University Bloomington. In addition, she is the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University.
Career
In 1973 she co-founded The Workshop in Political Theory and Public Policy at Indiana University with her husband, Vincent Ostrom. Considered an expert on collective action, trust, and the commons, her institutional approach to public policy was considered distinct enough to be thought of as a separate "school" of Public Choice Theory (See Mitchell 1988). She has authored many books in the fields of organizational theory, political science, and public administration.
Research
Ostrom is considered one of the leading scholars in the study of common pool resources. In particular, Ostrom's work emphasizes how humans and ecosystems interact to provide for long run sustainable resource yields. Forests, fisheries, oil fields, grazing lands, and irrigation systems, among others, all exhibit the characteristics of common pool resources and Ostrom's work has highlighted how humans have created diverse institutional arrangements over natural resources for thousands of years that have prevented ecosystem collapse. Yet, Ostrom is quick to point out that, while successes are abundant, humans are also responsible for countless ecosystem collapses. Her current work emphasizes the multifaceted nature of human-ecosystem interaction and argues against any singular "panacea" attempt to solve individual social-ecological system problems.
Notable publications- Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Ostrom, Elinor, Cambridge University Press, 1990
- Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective Ostrom, Elinor, and Schroeder, Larry, and Wynne, Susan, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993
- Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources Ostrom, Elinor, and Gardner, Roy, and Walker, James, Editors, Anne Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1994
- with Crawford, Sue E. S., “A Grammar of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 89, no.3 (September 1995): 582–600.
- A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997. Ostrom, Elinor, The American Political Science Review 92(1): 1-22. 1998
- Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons for Experimental Research {Volume VI in the Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, Elinor Ostrom and James Walker, Editors, Russell Sage Foundation, 2003
- Understanding Institutional Diversity Ostrom, Elinor, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 2005.
- Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice Ostrom, Elinor and Hess, Charlotte, Editors, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007
Oliver E. Williamson
Oliver Eaton Williamson (born September 27, 1932) is a prominent author in the area of transaction cost economics, a student of Ronald Coase, Herbert Simon and Richard Cyert. Williamson received his B.Sc. in management from the MIT Sloan School of Management in 1955, M.B.A. from Stanford University in 1960, and his Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University in 1963. He has held professorships in business administration, economics, and law at the University of California, Berkeley since 1988 and is currently the Edgar F. Kaiser Professor Emeritus at the Haas School of Business. In 2009 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for "his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm",[1] sharing it with Elinor Ostrom.
His focus on the costs of transactions have led Williamson to distinguish between repeated case-by-case bargaining on the one hand and relationship-specific contracts on the other. For example, the repeated purchasing of coal from a spot market to meet the daily or weekly needs of an electric utility would represent case by case bargaining. But over time, the utility is likely to form ongoing relationships with a specific supplier, and the economics of the relationship-specific dealings will be importantly different, he has argued.
Other economists have tested Williamson's transaction-cost theories in empirical contexts. One important example is a paper by Paul L. Joskow, "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," in American Economic Review, March 1987. The incomplete contracts approach to the theory of the firm and corporate finance is partly based on the work of Williamson and Coase.[2]
Theory
Oliver Williamson is credited with the development of the term "Information Impactedness", which applies in situations where it is difficult to ascertain what the costs to information are. This condition exists mainly because of uncertainty and opportunism, though bounded rationality is involved as well. It exists when true underlying circumstances relevant to the transaction, or related set of transactions, are known to one or more parties but cannot be costlessly discerned by or displayed for others." Market and Hierarchies
Selected papers
* Williamson OE. (2002). "The theory of the firm as governance structure: from choice to contract". Journal of economic perspectives 16 (3): 171–195. http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/bpp/oew/choicetocontract.pdf. Retrieved 2009-06-06.