(编者按：应读者要求，我们将演讲稿英文原文附在本文之后）

　　路透社全球总编 史进德 (David Schlesinger)

　　非常感谢清华大学邀请我来演讲。

　　在中国，就“新闻业与金融危机”这个话题发表演讲，与在世界任何其他地方讨论同一个话题相比，感觉是很不一样的。客观地说，中国的财经新闻还处在初级发展阶段；而与此同时，在全球范围内，财经新闻的行为与目的都在遭受严峻置疑甚至批评。

　　（2009年9月17日，路透社全球总编史进德在北京清华大学新闻与传播学院发表演讲。 摄影：路透/刘硕）

　　另外，尽管中国与世界其他国家一样遭到了金融危机的冲击，但中国经济增长的降幅远没有其他国家那麽剧烈。中国的独特国情，以及应对危机采取的措施，都令中国经济迅速反弹，与美国、英国、日本和其他G8国家的境遇截然不同。

　　我们在审视新闻业如何应对金融危机这个话题的同时，必须认识到，许多媒体的目标读者已经不再相信记者，不再相信新闻业。许多人甚至对媒体怒火重重，埋怨媒体没能预测到金融危机的到来。他们认为，如果我们准确预测了金融危机，就能够有办法阻止它的发生，至少能让他们减少损失。

　　此类批评不无道理。媒体的确远不够完美。我们的队伍中有懒惰的记者；有出於善意但没能充分理解自己报导内容的记者；媒体中不乏毫无主见，人云亦云者。也有些新闻机构——包括路透社在内——拥有高尚的理想和严格的标准，但仍旧犯了一些错误，没能完全遵守自己制定的规则。

　　这些问题都可能存在。但如果把金融危机归咎为媒体的失败，也是脱离现实的——人们对媒体的预期与媒体现实的职责之间存在差距。

　　即便是最高标准的新闻，也只能起到镜子的作用，将社会现状真实地、诚实地披露、反馈给社会。当我们没能胜任这项工作时——比如我们反馈给社会的图像不够清晰，或者发生任何一点点的扭曲时——我们就应该遭到批评。我们的目标就是努力做到最完美的镜子。

　　身处北京，我不禁想起中国古代历史巨作，开启伟大史志作品之先河的《资治通鉴》。毕竟，新闻难道不就是最初版本的历史吗？“资治通鉴”四个字的意思就是以历史为镜子，帮助治理国家。看来，司马光在1,000年前就找到了正确的答案！

　　如果说，有关媒体角色的正确答案是“镜子”，那麽什麽样的答案是错误的呢？

　　我认为，如果期望媒体或某位特定记者拥有可以精确预见未来的“魔法水晶球”，那就是错误的。那并不是我们应有的角色，我们也不应该奢望扮演那样的角色。

　　首先，让我们审视一下过去几年内财经新闻的工作环境与背景吧。

　　目前这场金融危机是我们这一代人经历过的最重大的财经新闻事件，可以说也是人类历史上最重大的新闻事件之一。它已经超越了财经新闻的范畴，这也就意味着许多此前从未报导过财经新闻的人、从未经历过金融萧条的人们也卷入其中，甚至是在很高的层面。结果就是，有些时候，记者们在报导这场金融危机的时候，未能如合格的财经记者那样提供多种不同的角度，照顾到各方面的事实。

　　作为一名记者，49岁的我有幸经历了异常精彩的时代，我也在工作中学到了从不同角度报导新闻事件的重要性。

　　我是1987年经济危机爆发前路透社在亚洲雇佣的最後一名记者。你们中的许多人也许那时还没有出生，但请相信我：那真是一个天翻地覆的年代，好像整个金融界的末日已经到来！在仅仅一天之内，全球范围内多个市场暴跌不止，世界经济遭受沉重打击。

　　10年之後，亚洲金融危机来袭，“末日”的感觉重现，似乎整个世界的进程将随之改变；而当现今这场金融危机降临时，“资本主义的末日”又成为人们的口头禅，不少人再度认为危机-复苏的周期将一去不复返。

　　但请记住，一面好的镜子是没有任何感情的，不会受情绪左右，只会忠实地、客观地反映现实情况。

　　在危机的空前规模和它引发的强烈情绪之外，我们还要意识到，在金融危机爆发前後，西方新闻业本身也在经历有史以来最严重的行业危机：媒体广告收入大幅下滑；受众人群锐减；高度依赖传统媒体的一代人逐渐退出历史舞台，取而代之的是对传统媒体感到非常厌倦的一代人。

　　于是，当记者们报导那些深陷空前危机的公司、产业和国家时，他们自己也身不由己地陷入这场危机。对他们自己来说，局势也是令人恐惧和难以捉摸的。我认为，那些本来应该保持客观立场报导危机的新闻人，由於过於担心自己在其中所处的角色而犯了错误。

　　就“镜子”这个比喻来说，当镜子中的映像与它反映的物体发生混淆时，镜子的可靠性就大打折扣了。

　　这场金融与媒体危机的另外一个背景是媒体科技的突飞猛进。随着媒体生产与传播内容方式的改变，媒体内容也应该随之转变。例如传播信息的聊天室，手机短信群组，博客和社交网络。这些新传播形式正在改变全世界的人们对新闻与信息的思维方式。

　　与此同时，“记者”这个概念的内涵也在发生变化。他们可能没有在清华大学新闻学院学习过，可能没有在路透社工作过，甚至可能从来没读过新华社的新闻，但只要他们通过手机、博客或社交网络报导新闻事件，他们就会成为今天的记者。

　　对於像我们这样的传统新闻从业者来说，我们就必须接受这些新生代的“记者”存在的现实，必须学会与他们竞争和合作。

　　在当前的环境下，读者和客户们有多种不同的需求，他们需要信息，同时也需要娱乐，他们还有社交需求。新的媒体和信息技术不但让这一切成为可能，而且成为生活的必需。

　　当金融危机爆发时，人们对新闻业有强烈的需求。

　　究竟发生了什麽？为什麽发生？该由谁承担责任？为什麽没早点报导这些情况？危机究竟什麽时候结束？ 我该怎麽办？

　　这些问题中，究竟有多少是记者能够真正回答的？从历史上看，能够就未来做出准确预言的记者寥寥无几。首先，没有几位记者具有能够做出预言的高度专业知识。而金融危机更让我们看到，所谓的“专家”在预见危机方面也没有任何过人之处。

　　同样，就危机给人们做出建议更是难上加难。说实话，我认识的多数记者连自己的财务问题都搞不清楚，更不用说向别人做出建议了。

　　记者们真正能够清楚回答的，能够附加最大价值的问题是，究竟发生了什麽，为什麽发生。实际上，能回答这两个问题已经是很了不起的事情，如果我们能真正圆满作答，我们应该感到十分骄傲了。

　　作为路透社记者，我们一向对自己报导中国经济的专业水平引以为豪。这意味着报导的透明和清晰，意味真实、不偏不倚地讲述事实；意味着独立报导，即使有时候会惹怒某些人、某些机构也在所不惜。这还意味着从读者的角度，从投资者的角度看问题，从任何需要了解事实以做出正确商业和投资决策的人们角度看问题。

　　下面，请让我再具体讲一讲我们的报导，以及我们在中国和世界其他地方汲取的一些经验教训。

　　路透社曾做出众多影响重大的独家报导，例如2007年中国大幅上调证券交易印花税以调控过热的股市。我们在报导中一贯对股市过热的倾向提出预警，例如今年7月27日对成渝高速<601107.SS>上市首日暴涨300%多的报导和分析。另外，中国最近四次降息的消息，路透社在所有外国新闻机构中也都是最先报导。对於中国如何成功避免了金融危机最危险的陷阱，我们也一直不遗余力地清晰报导。

　　在报导中，我们一直努力做到那面真实清晰的镜子，真实反映市场中变化和不变的因素。

　　当我从伦敦启程来北京的时候，20国集团财长和央行行长们正在开会讨论危机後新的世界经济秩序。很明显，全球资本主义体系不会被彻底改造，但也不会一成不变地回到危机前的情况：银行体系、金融市场监管制度、中央银行制度、全球经济政策协调等领域都将发生变革。

　　必须承认，在经济危机中，“中国模式”中的一些因素表现不俗，不但令中国受益，还帮助世界减小了经济萎缩的严重程度。

　　我相信，路透社的报导从几个关键方面让世界更好地了解中国的独特之处：

　　– 首先是政府对银行体系的管控。中国多数银行为国有，这就意味着中国不会出现严重的银行挤兑危机；人们非常清楚，政府会不惜代价防止这种情况。同样，在危机过程中，政府能够向银行施加压力，令它们扩大放贷规模而不是紧缩；从2008年12月开始的爆发式信贷增长是中国经济迅速复苏的重要原因，也为全球市场恢复信心立下汗马功劳。

　　这与其他国家的情况形成鲜明对比：其他国家政府即使是在将银行国有化之後，也无法令它们再度放贷。

　　现在看来，保持政府对这一国民经济关键部门的控制，是中国的明智之举。目前欧洲各国决策者们纷纷敦促银行牢记自己的责任，扩大信贷，还暗示如果它们不从，就可能采取诸如强制扩充资本等惩罚性措施，这听起来已经很像中国官员的口气了。

　　西方国家还不至于永久性将银行国有化，但从目前正在讨论和实施的大量监管改革措施来看，各国政府的确有意更加严密地控制银行的行为。

　　– 另外一个领域是宏观经济政策。危机当前，中国政府迅速制定了多重刺激经济措施，例如家电下乡。当今年早些时候中央政府决定扩大财政开支时，大批地方政府官员们几乎连夜进京，提交基础设施和工业项目的投资申请。同时，政府还启动大规模资源收储计划，在国际市场价格低迷的情况下购进金属和其他大宗商品，扩大了需求。

　　与许多西方国家对比，中国的上述对策更加迅捷，更加彻底。例如美国，由於11月大选和随後的政府更迭，大规模刺激计划被延迟了几个月。而多数欧洲国家去年提出初步刺激计划的步调还要晚于美国，部分原因是担心违反欧盟预算规章。也许这就是欧洲衰退程度更高的原因。

　　我们对中国的报导非常关注天量经济刺激计划中的风险：效率低下，产能过剩，腐败机会增加，污染环境等等。我们还多次指出，中国经济减速说明以出口和投资驱动的经济增长模式逐渐失败，中国需要另寻发展道路。

　　我们认为，这些关於风险的预警都是正确的。从长期来讲，中国的发展模式必然要改变，国内消费的比重需要增加；但另一方面，我们可能也低估了中国政府深度介入投资决策产生的益处：中国大规模推动投资，带动整个地区走出衰退，引领了全世界的复苏。

　　– 第三个方面是中国对於资产市场的干预。随着去年下半年危机爆发，中国开始大力干预资产市场。在人民币稳步升值三年之後，中国开始以非直接干预的方式让人民币与美元重新挂钩，这种非正式挂钩自2008年7月持续至今。2008年下半年，中国开始干预股市，刺激楼市，放松了仅仅几个月前推出的限制楼市投机的一些措施。

　　海外常常批评中国官方干预市场的举措——有关中国“操纵货币”的指责我们早已耳熟能详；中国股市也常被称为不按正常商业逻辑运行的“政策市”。但在危机压顶之下，全世界似乎都更加认可甚至采取了中国对待市场的方式。

　　刚才我提到，新闻业报导这场危机的难处之一在於新闻业自身也遭遇了危机。我们还必须记住，我们的消息来源和读者们也同样遭遇了危机。这就意味着人们对媒体报导的关注异常仔细，一旦有令人不快的内容，读者很快就会投诉。

　　我记得，有一天我的电话从早响到晚，因为一家大银行对我们记者的报导十分不满，他们的公关总监和其他高管不停打来投诉电话。我很严肃对待这些投诉，但经过仔细调查发现，我们的报导绝对准确，没有不实之处，但在写法上的确有可改进之处。

　　其他一些时候，我们的确犯过错误。但我们都按路透社的严格标准，迅速、公开地更正了报导。作为一家新闻机构，保持读者对我们的信任至关重要。如实报导、准确报导、更正错误、遵循标准都是我们的安身立命之本，容不得半点妥协，尤其是在报导重大复杂事件的时刻。

　　我们从这一时期的报导中也学到了重要的经验。

　　经验之一是，我们必须不断审视我们的标准，有时需要加强这些标准。由於新闻事件的敏感性，我们将使用匿名线索和报导市场传言的政策修改得更加严格——我们不能制造新闻，只能报导新闻。

　　如今，反思过去几年我们汲取的经验教训，我相信全世界的财经报导水平将有所提高。财经报导仍旧不是财经预言——新闻永远不会是魔力水晶球——但我们能够成为更清晰、更精确的镜子。

　　但这就够了吗？

　　对於其他一些需要专业知识、专业报导、需要读者高度关注的重要领域，我仍旧感到担忧。

　　例如，我们对全球变暖的报导，能否被称为好的“镜子”？我们对於资源供给问题和即将到来的水源危机的报导，是否正中要害？是否需要再来一场危机，才能改善我们的报导，才能改变社会的思维？

　　记者们拥有巨大力量。我们手中的镜子能够产生强烈的效果。但无论我们的镜子多平、多亮、多真实，社会必须有勇气正视这面镜子，才能让它起到应有的作用。

　　谢谢大家。（完）

　　THE MIRROR AND THE CRYSTAL BALL

　　A Speech to Tsinghua University

　　By David Schlesinger, Editor-in-Chief, Reuters

　　September 2009

　　Thank you for the invitation to address you here at Tsinghua University.

　　Giving a speech on journalism and the financial crisis in China is different from doing it anywhere else in the world.

　　Chinese financial journalism, I think it is fair to say, is in the early stages of development at the same time as financial journalism’s behaviour and purpose  is under severe scrutiny and even criticism elsewhere in the world.

　　Similarly, while China has been hit by the same global financial crisis as every country, economic growth never fell as much as elsewhere. .

　　China’s response and its particular conditions created a rebound off the lows, making the situation very different from that in the United States, the UK or Japan or, in fact, any of the traditional G8 countries.

　　When looking at the question of how journalism responded to the financial crisis, it is important to remember that many members of the media’s target audience no longer like or trust journalists or journalism.

　　Many are even angry at the media for not having predicted the financial crisis, thinking that if we had predicted it we could have somehow stopped it or at least saved them themselves from financial losses.

　　Some of this criticism is valid.

　　The media is far from perfect.

　　There are lazy reporters; there are well-meaning reporters who publish without fully understanding their subject.

　　There are publications that always follow and never lead. There are journalistic institutions – including Reuters – that have high standards and lofty ideals, but which sometimes make mistakes and fail to live up to their own rules.

　　All this may be true. But to call this a failure of the media exposes a contradiction between the expectations people have of the media and the realities of what journalists actually can do best.

　　Journalism at its best is a mirror, exposing back to society a true and brutally honest picture of what is going on.

　　When we fail at that, when our picture is not clear or is at all distorted, we deserve to be criticised.

　　We must strive to be that perfect mirror.

　　Being here in Beijing, it is worth remembering that marvellous book of Chinese history that really began the art of true historiography (and what, of course, is journalism but the first draft of history?). I’m talking about the  资治通鉴; or the Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government.

　　Almost 1,000 years ago, Sima Guang had precisely the right idea!

　　So if the Mirror is the right idea, what do I think is the wrong one?

　　That is to expect the media or a particular journalist to have a crystal ball – one that can look into the future and predict the future with clarity. That, I believe, is not our role and not even one to aspire to.

　　Let’s begin by looking at the context of how business journalism did its job during the past few years.

　　To begin with, this was the biggest financial story of a generation and, in fact, one of the biggest stories of any kind at all. That burst the story out of the business news department and it meant that a lot of people who had never covered a business story or who had never experienced a financial down turn got involved, often at senior levels.

　　As a consequence, sometimes the needed perspective wasn’t there.

　　I’m only 49 but I’ve been lucky enough as a journalist to have lived through some very interesting times. And I’ve learned the importance of perspective.

　　I joined Reuters as the last person hired in Asia before the crash of 1987.

　　Maybe some of you hadn’t been born then, but believe me it seemed like the end of the financial world as we knew it!

　　Markets the world over fell like there was no bottom during one awful day, and the world was left reeling.

　　A decade later, when the Asian financial crisis hit, it again seemed like a blow that would change the course of world events. And now when this current crisis came, it became all too easy to talk about the “end of capitalism” or to think that the cycle would never turn again.

　　But remember, a good mirror has no emotions. A good mirror doesn’t get swept along on sentiment. A good mirror simply and perfectly tells the story as it is.

　　Beyond the enormity and the emotion of the events themselves, this financial crisis occurred in the midst of the biggest business challenges for western journalistic organisations ever.

　　Advertising fell away; audiences fell away; a generation passed from one that relied on traditional media to one that in many ways despised traditional media.

　　So at the same time as journalists reported on industries, companies and countries struggling to deal with a frightening new situation and uncharted waters, they themselves were swept up in their own story - one that was confusing and frightening to them.

　　There is nothing that clouds a mirror more than when there’s confusion between the observed and the observer. And in this crisis, I believe those who should have been watching were too often too worried about their own roles in the drama.

　　The final bit of context that is crucial to think about is that this financial and media crisis occurred precisely at a time when technology changed fundamentally. And as soon as the means of production and distribution change the way they have, the content and the creation of that content have to change as well.

　　Think of the chat rooms that now convey information. Think of SMS message groups. Blogging. Social networking. These are changing the way people think about news and information everywhere in the world, including here in China.

　　The definition of who is a journalist changes too. They may not be a student here at Tsinghua; they may not work for me at Reuters; they may never even read Xinhua regularly, yet if they create content about news events on their phone or on their blog or with a social media site, they are the journalists of today.

　　And if you then work in a more traditional journalistic organisation, you will need to compete with them and cooperate with them and accept that they are there and part of today’s universe of news.

　　And in that universe there are many different demands. People still want to be informed. They want to be entertained as well. And they want to be part of a community. The new technology not only makes all of this possible, but it makes it a requirement as well.

　　When the financial crisis broke, the demands on journalism were keen.

　　What’s happening?

　　Why is it happening?

　　Who is to blame?

　　Why didn’t you tell me sooner?

　　When will it end?

　　What should I do?

　　How many of these questions were journalists really capable of answering clearly? The history of journalists making predictions is a chequered one. First of all, few journalists have the expertise to make accurate predictions. And we know from this financial crisis that even most so-called experts failed to make good predictions as well.

　　Giving good advice is equally hard – to be frank, most journalists I know don’t even manage their own finances well, let alone being able to tell others what to do.

　　Where journalists can and should add the greatest value is in answering clearly the questions of what is happening and why. But that in and of itself is actually a great service, and one that we should be proud of when we do it well.

　　In Reuters, we pride ourselves in covering the Chinese economy professionally and with as much expertise as we can. That means offering transparency and clarity. That means telling the story truthfully, without bias. That means being independent and sometimes angering people or institutions who would rather not have things reported. It also means standing on the side of the audience, standing on the side of true investors, standing on the side of anyone who wants and needs the truth in order to do their business or make good decisions.

　　Let me talk to you a bit about our coverage and some of the lessons we’ve learned here in China and around the world.

　　Reuters has had some big scoops, like  when China tripled  its trading tax in 2007 to  cool the runaway stock market. Our reporting has also has consistently warned against the overheated stock market, most recently this year when an IPOs like Sichuan Expressway quadrupled in its debut.(before the market’s 20-pct plunge). We had the news first on four consecutive rate cuts and news that China had joined G7 countries in a concerted effort to unfreeze credit markets. We have tried to report clearly how China avoided the crisis’s biggest traps.

　　Throughout our coverage, we have tried to be that clear mirror that shows what has changed but also what hasn’t changed.

　　As I left London for China, finance ministers and central bankers of the G20 group of nations had just met to discuss the shape of the new, post-crisis order. It was clear that the global capitalist system wouldn’t be radically reworked, but it was also clear that the world wasn’t going to return  all the way to business as normal; banking, financial market regulation, central banking, global economic policy coordination and other areas will change.

　　It is important to give credit to the fact that elements of China’s model worked well during the crisis; that helped China itself, but it also helped the world limit the severity of the global downturn.

　　I believe our reporting in several key areas helped the world get a clearer picture of what was particular about China.

　　One area was state control of the banking system. The government’s ownership of most of the banks meant China didn’t suffer anything close to a serious bank run; people knew the state would do what it took to prevent a failure. Just as importantly, the government was able to pressure banks into expanding, not shrinking, their lending during the crisis; the explosion of lending that began in December 2008 was a major reason for the economy’s quick recovery and improving confidence in markets around the world.

　　This was a big contrast to the rest of the world, where governments couldn’t get banks lending again even after they nationalised them.

　　Keeping control of this key sector of the economy now looks like a wise precaution by China, and policymakers in Europe have been sounding a bit like Chinese officials in urging banks to remember their responsibility to lend and hinting at possible action such as forced recapitalisation if they don’t toe the line.

　　Nobody is talking about permanently nationalising Western banks but the tremendous amount of regulatory initiatives being discussed and implemented shows governments want to be able to control their behaviour much more tightly.

　　Another important area was macroeconomic policy. China’s government was fast in deciding upon and implementing stimulus steps, such as a big programme to help rural residents buy consumer electronics; when the government decided early this year that it needed to boost fiscal spending, local government officials flocked to Beijing almost overnight to resubmit applications for infrastructure and industrial investment projects. Also, the state introduced big resource stockpiling programmes that boosted demand for metals and other commodities (and took advantage of low global prices). This response was faster and more comprehensive than policymakers in many Western countries; in the U.S., major stimulus steps were delayed for several months by the approach of the November election and the interregnum before Obama’s inauguration. Most European nations were slower than the U.S. last year to introduce initial packages of stimulus steps, partly because of concern they would break EU budget rules; that may be why the recession has been deeper in Europe.

　　Much of our coverage focused on the risks involved in China’s breakneck stimulus: the inefficiencies, the danger of creating overcapacity, the increased opportunities for corruption and the damage to the environment. We also repeatedly said China’s economic slowdown showed its export-oriented, investment-led growth model was failing and that China needed to find a new model.

　　We were correct about the all risks and in the long term, the growth model certainly needs to change, becoming weighted more towards domestic consumption. But we may have understated the benefits during the crisis of heavy state involvement in investment decisions around the country — China’s ability to ramp up investment artificially helped to push the entire region out of the slump well before the rest of the world.

　　A third area was intervention in asset markets. As the crisis erupted in the second half of last year, China began intervening aggressively in its asset markets. After three years of rapid yuan appreciation, it used its mid-point system and indirect intervention when necessary to effectively repeg the yuan to the dollar; the informal peg has been in place since July 2008. Later in the year it began intervening in its stock market. It also started adjusting residential property market regulation to stimulate the market, loosening restrictions that in some cases had been imposed just months earlier to curb speculative buying of property.

　　Official Chinese intervention in markets often gets criticised abroad — China is accused of currency manipulation and its stock market is dismissed as a policy-directed market where normal commercial decisions don’t apply. But in the wake of the crisis, the rest of the world seems to have moved somewhat closer to China’s approach to the markets.

　　I mentioned earlier that one of the difficulties in reporting this story was that journalism was in crisis at the same time as the economy was. It’s important to remember that our sources and our readers were in crisis, too, and this meant that our stories were watched extremely carefully and people were quick to complain about anything they didn’t like.

　　I remember one day when my mobile phone rang constantly from morning to night with calls from the head of PR and senior officials from a large bank complaining about our reporters and their coverage.

　　I took the complaints very seriously and investigated, but decided that our reporting had been absolutely sound and our story accurate, though we should have written it better.

　　There were other times when we did make errors, and just as our standards demand of us, we corrected those errors swiftly and publicly.

　　Maintaining our trust with our audience is fundamental to our mission as a news service. Reporting truthfully, reporting accurately, correcting errors, obeying our standards are all vital and can’t be compromised, especially not in the heat of a major and complex story.

　　We’ve learned important lessons from this period.

　　One lesson was that our standards needed to be constantly examined and sometimes strengthened.

　　Because of the sensitivities of the story, we toughened our policy on using anonymous sources and reporting on market rumours because we did not want to actually cause a story – we only wanted to report on it.

　　As we gather here in September 2009, the financial crisis has our attention now, and I’m sure that after we have all learned the lessons from the past several years economic and business reporting throughout the world will be better than it was.

　　It still won’t be predictive – it will never be a good crystal ball – but it will be a much clearer and more accurate mirror.

　　But is that enough?

　　I worry about other important subjects that need lots of expertise and lots of expert reporting – and that require the public to sit up and pay attention.

　　Is our reporting on global warming a truly good mirror for what is going on? Is our reporting on looming issues with resource supplies or the coming water shortages shining the light where it needs to be shone?

　　Or will it take a new crisis, a new shock, to focus people’s attention and to make the reporting – and make society — better?

　　Journalists have a lot of power – the mirror we hold up to society is powerful and can have a tremendous effect. But however much we hone our tools and make our mirror clear and bright and accurate, society itself must look bravely into it for our reporting truly to be useful.

　　Thank you.