本文翻译于2005年7月22日。原文作者 Jonathan Anderson  系瑞银华宝亚洲区首席经济学家。

　　1、 到底发生了什么？
　　昨天晚上，中国政府公布了对于人民币汇率制度的两个新举措。
　　一是美元对人民币交易价格调整为1美元兑8.11元人民币，人民币升值2%；二是人民币汇率不再盯住单一美元，将参考一篮子货币进行调节。
　　现阶段，每日银行间外汇市场美元对人民币的交易价仍在人民银行公布的美元交易中间价上下千分之三的幅度内浮动，非美元货币对人民币的交易价在人民银行公布的该货币交易中间价上下一定幅度内浮动。
　　2、 为什么要调整汇率？
　　形成更富弹性的人民币汇率机制一直是中国政府的政策改革目标。从长期来看，浮动汇率制将使得中国政府能形成自主的货币政策机制，就象当初避免亚洲金融危机一般。别忘了，大多数新兴市场危机都来自于长期以来实行的固定汇率制度与国内政策之间的不融合性。人民币汇率此次调整将是向可浮动汇率制度长期、渐进发展过程的一个开端。
　　3、 为什么是现在进行调整？
　　四方面的因素可以参考，一是中国政府已经悄悄的培养了技术处理能力，包括有限的远期交易市场和一个更广的做市商系统等，这些提升了经济体系应对信心；二是中国外贸的不平衡性加强，随着对外贸易的快速增长，外汇储备迅猛增长，对国内货币体系带来很大的影响；1年前，当局可以争论这种过剩可能只是暂时的，但现在这种争论可以休止了。
　　三是国际上政治压力，特别是美国可能将进行的贸易保护制裁法案。最后一点是今年夏天是一个很好的时机，因为6月和9月市场投机资金和资本流入减少。
　　4、 政府会利用汇率调整的方式为经济降温吗？
　　一些观察人士将这次汇率调整与本周发布的超出预期增长的经济数据挂钩，但是，我们认为这些经济数据并没有起到什么作用。首先，政府没有在经济调控政策中提到人民币汇率问题；并且，虽然增长看上去依然很高，但实际上过热的经济已经较12个月前明显放缓，而通胀的压力则正在消退之中。如果政府考虑要用人民币汇率调整来冷却经济，则2003年底就已经是最合理的时间选择。
　　最后，仅仅2%的幅度解决不了多大的问题。
　　5、 美国的压力起了关键作用？
　　不少美国国会议员可能愿意相信这一点。我们也相信美国贸易保护压力例如关于中国操纵货币市场的报告等具有一定的潜在影响，并可能影响到了人民币汇率调整的时间选择。然而，我们更愿意相信中国并非是迫于美国人的压力。别忘了，人民币汇率的调整关乎中国自己长期的发展利益问题，中国政府为此已经准备了至少2年的时间。
　　6、 盯注一篮子货币如何运作？
　　概念很简单，例如，如果欧元在人民币盯注的"一篮子货币"中权重为20%，则如果欧元相对于美圆升值10%，则人民币就相应的调整为相对美圆升值2%，而相对于欧元贬值8%（假设其他货币相对美圆汇率保持不变）。不过实际运行上，如果其他货币汇率波动较大，人民银行可能选择弱化这种与美圆之间的波动范围。具体的请参考本文第20条。
　　7、 关于一篮子货币权重政府还没有宣布这种权重配置，我们也没有去预期具体因素。相反，我们认为中国可能会借鉴新加坡模式，具体请参考本文第20条。
　　8、 为什么是如此小幅度的上调？
　　其实这并不奇怪，这与我们之前的预期基本一致。政府非常在意人民币汇率的大幅度调整可能给经济带来的负面影响，特别是银行体系和出口贸易。正如接下来我们将要讨论到的，我们认为从中期来看，人民币还将有更大的增值空间，但是在当下，采取渐进的、小幅调整的策略是一种避免犯错误的方式。
　　9、 对中国进出口贸易的影响？
　　简单的推算，我们认为2%的调整不会对中国的进出口贸易有任何实质性的影响。但明显的，如果人民币持续升值，则中长期的影响会更大。
　　10、对中国GDP增长的影响？
　　没任何影响。保持之前对于GDP、通胀和就业水平的预测。
　　11、中国的银行体系能够承受吗？
　　在我们看来，所谓的中国银行系统在人民币汇率的调整过程中将受到冲击是非常荒谬的说法。商业银行的开放程度并不大，我们认为大多数银行依然是人民币的长期持有者。我们认为，随着浮动汇率或者快速的资本帐户项目的开放，银行将迎来一段猛烈的调整时期，但是这个时间目前还没有到来。
　　12、会影响到中国在亚洲的竞争力吗？
　　我们认为至少短期内不会有什么影响，中国制造工人每月100美金还是102美金好象还不会带来什么本质的变化。但也正如我们接下来要讨论的，中长期的影响将会越来越大，如果人民币保持持续升值的话。
　　13、区域内其他货币流通会有什么样的影响呢？
　　直接的表现是亚洲货币对于美圆已经表现出相对强势。但是我们认为仅仅2%的升值还远没有到极大的影响其他亚洲央行行动的程度。
　　14、对于美国制造业者和消费者会有什么影响？
　　对于美国的消费者、制造业者或者是经常性帐户，这种影响目前还比较难说。要记得，中国的出口有相当低的国内价值成分，并且最终的美国消费价格还包括了比重较大的运输和零售成本；并且，美国与中国直接竞争的产业还很少，因此，人民币升值对于美国的影响程度远比对中国的亚洲邻居们小得多。
　　15、对于美国债券市场和美圆的影响？
　　直接的表现是，美国债券价格下降以及美圆走弱。但是我们认为这种趋势难以维持。正如我们上文所说的，这个升值幅度对于中国的进出口贸易影响非常小，并且我们认为其对于投机资本流动的影响也将相当温和。
　　换句话来说，人民银行应该继续保持对于外汇市场的干预，继续向之前一样利用外汇储备进行买入操作。虽然有些观察者认为中国将卖出美圆资产以进行分散化投资，但我们认为这并不会发生。事实上，中国已经对美圆资产进行了数年的分散化投资，并成为欧元强劲的支持者。
　　16、这将改善还是伤害到商品市场？
　　大多数商品价格价格已经反弹，市场推测人民币升值将使得原材料显得更便宜，因此中国将增加购买量。我们认可这个逻辑原则，但是，再次强调，仅仅2%的变化对于实际情况会有多大的影响。我们对于采矿和日用品市场保持一定乐观趋向，但是，支持这种趋势的是供给和需求，而不是短期的流动性影响。
　　17.本次调整能否结束国外保护主义者的压力？
　　肯定不能。美国白宫和国会有关人士会指出：1）本次升值说明中国承认人民币被低估；2）2%调整太少；3）美国应该动用制裁手段逼迫中国更多让步。从另一方面看，本次调整给了中国政府和美国政府讨论进一步调整的机会，让中国政府掌握升值的步伐应该最符合美国的利益。
　　18.人民币仍然被低估么？
　　我们从基本面和中期评估，人民币被低估15%（人民币短期由于贸易顺差和资本流入面临升值30%的压力）。显然，2%的升值不足以改变人民币的低估。
　　19.逐步升值是否会导致更多投机？
　　我们认为中期里，人民币将逐步升值。如此是否会吸引更多的投机资本流入呢？有些观察人士认为中国将面临大量的资本流入并击垮中国央行维持人民币稳定的能力。我们的观点是，投资者最终将惊讶于资本流入为何如此之少。为什么？因为中国实行严格的资本管制，国外大多数资本玩家无法进入国内人民币市场。虽然大陆银行和企业确实可以很方便的将投机资本带入中国，当我们看到在人民币升值呼声较高的过去18个月，这些投机资本进入中国的规模并没有增长，因为金融监管机构加强了监管、加大了执法力度。
　　20.人民币升值下一步将会发生什么？是调整的终点还是起点？
　　根据上面的讨论，我们显然不认为这次调整为人民币调整的终点。将人民币调整2%然后保持不变是毫无意义的做法。因此，我们认为这次调整为长期调整过程的第一步，人民币最终过度到类似日元的有管理的灵活的浮动汇率机制。
　　在接下来的几个月里，中国人民银行将会让人民币停留在交易平价附近而不做过多干预，因为央行需评股新的汇率体系的效果。
　　接下来，如果央行相信经济增长仍然强劲，而且银行系统为更灵活的汇率体系做好了准备、投机资本流入得到控制，央行将会允许人民币对一揽子货币的汇率调整更为灵活，这是新加坡在亚洲金融危机以前所做的。我们预期中国将会建立人民币对一揽子货币的不断升值趋势，从而减轻资本账户的压力，并使人民币汇率达到中期平衡水平。
　　另外派送一个问题，问题21：港元会随着人民币升值吗？
　　答案是不会，我们没有看到任何迹象。

原文如下:

The 20 key questions

1. What actually happened?Yesterday evening the Chinese government announced two changes in the renminbi exchange rate regime,both effective immediately (the text of the announcement can be found at www.pbc.gov.cn):?The central parity rate against the US dollar has been changed to RMB8.11=US$1 (i.e., animmediate 2% revaluation from the old rate of around RMB8.278=US$1).?Going forward, the renminbi will follow a basket of currencies (including the dollar, the euro, theyen and other major currencies) rather than just the dollar.?The authorities also made reference to a band system, whereby the renminbi can appreciate ordepreciate by up to 0.3% against the previous day抯 closing US dollar quote梑ut this is not actuallya change, since the same system has actually been in place for the past decade (albeit rarely used inpractice).2. Why move the exchange rate at all?Moving to a more flexible exchange rate regime has always been a stated policy goal of the Chinesegovernment梐nd we agree that it抯 a good idea. In the long term, a floating rate gives China the ability torun a fully independent monetary policy, as well as avoid the pitfalls of the Asian crisis economies.Remember that most emerging market crises come from trying to hold on to a fixed exchange rate too long inthe face of incompatible domestic policies. As we will argue below, this move marks the beginning of a long,gradual move to a floating renminbi exchange rate.

3. Why now?
We see four factors at play: First, the government has been quietly beefing up technical trading capacity at
home, including limited forward markets and a wider “market maker” system, which helped raise
confidence that the economy is ready. Second, China’s external imbalances have been intensifying, with a
sharply rising trade balance, a flood of FX reserve inflows and a vast monetary sterilization effort at home;
as late as a year ago, the authorities could argue that balance of payments surpluses were temporary, but
those arguments have been wearing increasingly thin. Third, foreign political pressure to move the renminbi
has increased rapidly, and the US in particular looked set to introduce protectionist sanctions in the fall. And
finally, we have consistently noted that the summer would be a good time to go, since both market
speculation and capital inflows tend to fade between June and September.
4. Is the government using the exchange rate to cool down the economy?
No. Some observers have tied the exchange rate move to this week’s economic data releases, which show
higher-than-expected growth; however, we don’t believe this played any role whatsoever. To begin with, the
government has never discussed the renminbi in the context of cyclical macro policies. Moreover, while the
authorities still see growth as high, activity has clearly slowed from the overheated pace of 12 months ago,
and inflation pressures are fading; if the government was thinking about using the renminbi to cool the
economy down, the end of 2003 would have been the logical time to go. And finally, a 2% move is simply
too little to matter in the near term—about which more below.
5. Did US pressure play a key role?
Not as much as some in the US Congress would like to believe. We do believe protectionist pressures, such
as the pending Treasury report on currency manipulation as well as bills in the House and Senate forcing
potential sanctions, helped influence the timing of the move. However, we certainly don’t see the Chinese as
“bowing” to US demands. Remember, a renminbi adjustment is clearly in China’s own long-term interests,
and the government has been preparing this move for at least two years.
6. How does a basket peg work?
The concept is very simple; before yesterday, the renminbi was effectively tied to the US dollar, which
meant that the currency would follow the dollar regardless of what happened to the euro, yen or other
currencies. Now, if the euro or yen move against the dollar, the renminbi should follow in line with the
effective trade weight. For example, if the euro has a 20% weight in the renminbi “basket”, then a 10%
bilateral euro appreciation against the dollar should result in the renminbi strengthening by 2% against the
dollar, and weakening by 8% against the euro (assuming that all other global currencies remain unchanged
against the dollar).
In practice, the PBC may choose to dampen bilateral renminbi fluctuations against the dollar if global
currencies are too volatile, but this remains to be seen. The authorities may also decide to build in a “drift”
against the entire basket; see question #20 below.
7. Do we know the basket weights?
No, the government has not announced weights, and we don’t expect them to do so going forward. Instead,
we think China will follow the Singapore model, keeping both weights and effective bands confidential.
This would allow maximum flexibility in currency policy (again, see question #20 below).

8. Why such a small up-front adjustment?
We don’t see this as a surprise; the move was exactly in line with our own expectations as well as the
market consensus. The government has been very forthcoming about its concerns that a big renminbi
adjustment could have unexpected negative effects on the economy, and especially banks and exporters.
This is particularly true since almost no one in the economy has access to hedging instruments. As we
discuss further below, we do believe the renminbi will appreciate much more in the medium term—but for
now, the strategy is clearly to take things slow, one step at a time, to make sure things don’t go wrong along
the way.
9. How will the move affect China’s trade?
Simply put, we don’t see any effect whatsoever of a 2% revaluation on exports or imports. Obviously, the
medium-term impact should be greater if (as we expect) the renminbi continues to appreciate.
10. How will the move affect GDP growth?
Not at all—we are not changing our forecasts for growth, inflation or employment.
11. Can the banking system afford it?
In our view, one of the greatest myths in China is that the banking system would suffer under a renminbi
revaluation. Commercial banks’ open positions are simply not that big, and we suspect that for most banks
those positions (whether reported or not) are now long renminbi. We agree that banks would have a harder
time coping with a volatile floating exchange rate or a sharp capital account opening—but neither of these is
on the cards for the time being.
12. Does this change China’s competitiveness with the rest of Asia?
Not in the near term; we don’t see how it matters if Chinese manufacturing wages are US$100 per month or
US$102 per month. As we discuss below, the medium-term impact should be bigger if the renminbi
continues to appreciate over time.
13. What will happen to other regional currencies?
So far the immediate effect of the announcement has been to push Asian currencies stronger against the
dollar. But we just don’t think that a 2% renminbi move is big enough to cause a radical “sea change” in
other Asian central banks’ behavior.
14. How will the move affect US producers and consumers?
It’s hard to see any effect at all from a 2% appreciation from the renminbi, on consumers, producers or the
current account balance. Remember that Chinese exports have a fairly low domestic value component, and
that the final US consumer price also includes a heavy share of shipping and retail costs. Meanwhile, there
are very few industries indeed where US and Chinese workers compete head-to-head, which makes the
impact on the US economy much less than the impact on China’s Asian neighbors (and even here, we don’t
see any near-term effect; see #12 above).
15. What about US treasury markets and the US dollar?

The immediate effect of the renminbi announcement has been to push US treasury prices down and weaken
the dollar, but we suspect these trends will prove short-lived. As we argued above, the move is too small to
affect China’s trade balance, and we will see in #19 below that the impact on speculative flows is likely to
be fairly moderate.
In other words, the PBC should continue to intervene in FX markets, buying up just as much FX reserves as
before. And although some observers argue that China will sell the dollar in order to diversify reserves in
line with its trade weights, we don’t believe that will happen; in fact China has been diversifying reserves
away from the dollar for years, and has been a particularly strong historical supporter of the euro.
16. Will this help or hurt upstream commodity markets?
So far most commodity prices have bounced upwards following the announcement, presumably on the view
that a renminbi appreciation makes raw materials cheaper and thus China will buy more of them. We agree
with the logic in principle—but again, it’s hard to see how a 2% move matters at all in practice. Our global
basic materials team is positive on upstream mining and commodities from a market sentiment perspective,
but maintains its focus on underlying supply and demand fundamentals rather than the near-term currency
impact.
17. Is this move enough to stop foreign protectionist pressures?
This is not clear. On the one hand, members of the US House and Senate will almost certainly argue that (i)
the fact that China moved at all is a de facto admission that the renminbi is undervalued; (ii) a 2%
adjustment is far too small, and (iii) the US should apply sanctions to force China to do more. On the other
hand, the move gives both the Chinese government and the US administration a chance to argue that this is
the beginning of a bigger adjustment process, and that US interests would be best served by allowing China
to move at its own pace. We’ll be watching developments closely.
18. Is the renminbi still undervalued?
Our estimates show that the renminbi is probably 15% undervalued in a medium-term, fundamental sense
(and faces near-term appreciation pressures of up to 30% due to the cyclically high trade balance and strong
capital inflows). Clearly, an initial 2% move doesn’t make much of an impact on those estimates.
19. Won’t a gradual strategy just lead to more speculation?
As discussed in the next point below, we agree that there’s more renminbi flexibility—and more
appreciation—to come in the medium term. And on the face of it, this should give a much greater incentive
to convert FX funds into renminbi; some observers go so far as to argue that China will face a “wall” of
speculative inflows that could overwhelm the PBC’s ability to keep the renminbi stable.
In our view, the real surprise will be just how small the increase in speculative pressures is. Why? Because
China has a closed capital account, which means that most foreign players have no access to onshore
renminbi funds. It’s true that mainland banks and firms (including foreign-invested firms) have had an
easier time bringing portfolio capital into the country—but it’s also true that the size of those portfolio flows
hasn’t changed over the last 18 months, despite increasing speculation on a renminbi move. The reason is
that the monetary authorities have been continually closing legal loopholes and intensifying their
enforcement efforts on external capital flows. In short, we aren’t looking for a “wall” of capital to come
flooding in any time soon.

20. What will happen to the renminbi now? Is this the end of the adjustment, or is there more to come?
From the above discussion, it should already be clear that we don’t see this announcement as the end of the
adjustment process; in our view, it makes no sense whatsoever to simply move the renminbi by 2% and
leave it there. Instead, we believe this is just the first step in a long, gradual process of shifting to a more
flexible exchange rate, with a “managed float” similar to the current yen arrangement as the end goal.
And this means that we should see more movement ahead. Our most likely scenario would look as follows:
In the next few months, the PBC would stay fairly close to the current trade-weighted parity (although they
could well intervene to keep the renminbi from fluctuating too much against the dollar if global currencies
were particularly volatile) while they gauge the effectiveness of the new mechanism.
Then, once they are convinced that the economy is still strong, that the banking system is ready for more
flexibility and that speculative inflows are broadly under control, they would take advantage of the existing
de jure band system to widen the “effective” trading bands and allow the renminbi to drift more flexibly
against the entire basket. This is exactly what Singapore did in the 1990s prior to the Asian crisis—and, just
as in the Singapore case, we would expect China to build in a trend appreciation against the basket, in order
to gradually relieve balance of payments pressures and bring the renminbi closer to its medium-term
equilibrium level.
And here’s our special bonus question #21: Will the Hong Kong dollar follow the renminbi?
No. We don’t see any chance of this happening.