经历了1999年的低谷,2000年伯克希尔的业绩超过标普15%以上,在这个时代达到了很高的水平,巴菲特很庆幸自己没有卷入网络股泡沫之灾,这一点曾在1999年被广泛质疑,被认为是1999年业绩差的一个原因.,难怪巴菲特很自豪地在给股东的信开头就列上了1965年到2000年伯克希尔的业绩表,喜悦之情溢于言表.
Berkshires Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
Annual Percentage Change |
|||
Year |
in Per-Share |
in S&P 500 |
Relative Results (1)-(2) |
1965 |
23.8 |
10.0 |
13.8 |
1966 |
20.3 |
(11.7) |
32.0 |
1967 |
11.0 |
30.9 |
(19.9) |
1968 |
19.0 |
11.0 |
8.0 |
1969 |
16.2 |
(8.4) |
24.6 |
1970 |
12.0 |
3.9 |
8.1 |
1971 |
16.4 |
14.6 |
1.8 |
1972 |
21.7 |
18.9 |
2.8 |
1973 |
4.7 |
(14.8) |
19.5 |
1974 |
5.5 |
(26.4) |
31.9 |
1975 |
21.9 |
37.2 |
(15.3) |
1976 |
59.3 |
23.6 |
35.7 |
1977 |
31.9 |
(7.4) |
39.3 |
1978 |
24.0 |
6.4 |
17.6 |
1979 |
35.7 |
18.2 |
17.5 |
1980 |
19.3 |
32.3 |
(13.0) |
1981 |
31.4 |
(5.0) |
36.4 |
1982 |
40.0 |
21.4 |
18.6 |
1983 |
32.3 |
22.4 |
9.9 |
1984 |
13.6 |
6.1 |
7.5 |
1985 |
48.2 |
31.6 |
16.6 |
1986 |
26.1 |
18.6 |
7.5 |
1987 |
19.5 |
5.1 |
14.4 |
1988 |
20.1 |
16.6 |
3.5 |
1989 |
44.4 |
31.7 |
12.7 |
1990 |
7.4 |
(3.1) |
10.5 |
1991 |
39.6 |
30.5 |
9.1 |
1992 |
20.3 |
7.6 |
12.7 |
1993 |
14.3 |
10.1 |
4.2 |
1994 |
13.9 |
1.3 |
12.6 |
1995 |
43.1 |
37.6 |
5.5 |
1996 |
31.8 |
23.0 |
8.8 |
1997 |
34.1 |
33.4 |
.7 |
1998 |
48.3 |
28.6 |
19.7 |
1999 |
.5 |
21.0 |
(20.5) |
2000 |
6.5 |
(9.1) |
15.6 |
Average Annual Gain ¾ 1965-2000 |
23.6% |
11.8% |
11.8% |
Overall Gain ¾ 1964-2000 |
207,821% |
5,383% |
202,438% |
股票投资市值超过10亿美圆.
|
|
12/31/00 |
||
Shares |
Company |
Cost |
Market |
|
|
|
(dollars in millions) |
||
151,610,700 |
American Express Company |
$1,470 |
$ 8,329 |
|
200,000,000 |
The Coca-Cola Company |
1,299 |
12,188 |
|
96,000,000 |
The Gillette Company |
600 |
3,468 |
|
1,727,765 |
The Washington Post Company |
11 |
1,066 |
|
55,071,380 |
Wells Fargo & Company |
319 |
3,067 |
|
|
Others |
6,703 |
9,501 |
|
|
Total Common Stocks |
$10,402 |
$37,619 |
|
|
|
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In 2000, we sold nearly all of our Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae shares, established 15% positions in several mid-sized companies, bought the high-yield bonds of a few issuers (very few ¾ the category is not labeled junk without reason) and added to our holdings of high-grade, mortgage-backed securities. 本年度卖出了几乎所有FREDDIE MAC和FANNIE MAE股份,购买了几只高收益债券.
Sources of Reported Earnings
(in millions) |
||||
Pre-Tax Earnings |
Berkshires Share |
|||
2000 |
1999 |
2000 |
1999 |
|
Operating Earnings: |
||||
Insurance Group: |
||||
Underwriting ¾ Reinsurance |
$(1,399) |
$(1,440) |
$(899) |
$(927) |
Underwriting ¾ GEICO |
(224) |
24 |
(146) |
16 |
Underwriting ¾ Other Primary |
38 |
22 |
24 |
14 |
Net Investment Income |
2,747 |
2,482 |
1,929 |
1,764 |
Finance and Financial Products Business |
556 |
125 |
360 |
86 |
Flight Services |
213 |
225 |
126 |
132 |
MidAmerican Energy (76% owned) |
197 |
-- |
109 |
-- |
Retail Operations |
175 |
130 |
104 |
77 |
Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation) |
122 |
147 |
80 |
92 |
Other Businesses |
225 |
210 |
134 |
131 |
Purchase-Accounting Adjustments |
(881) |
(739) |
(843) |
(648) |
Corporate Interest Expense |
(92) |
(109) |
(61) |
(70) |
Shareholder-Designated Contributions |
(17) |
(17) |
(11) |
(11) |
Other |
39 |
25 |
30 |
15 |
Operating Earnings |
1,699 |
1,085 |
936 |
671 |
Capital Gains from Investments |
3,955 |
1,365 |
2,392 |
886 |
Total Earnings ¾ All Entities |
$5,654 |
$2,450 |
$3,328 |
$1,557 |
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伯克希尔的实业似乎乏善可陈. 保险业务看上去损失很大.
I clearly made a mistake in paying what I did for Dexter in 1993. Furthermore, I compounded that mistake in a huge way by using Berkshire shares in payment. Last year, to recognize my error, we charged off all the remaining accounting goodwill that was attributable to the Dexter transaction. We may regain some economic goodwill at Dexter in the future, but we clearly have none at present.鞋业公司仍毫无起色.巴菲特有些后悔1993年买入这家公司的决定,特别是用交换伯克希尔公司的股份来购买,使得鞋业的业绩看上去更糟了.
Last year I told you that EJA’s recurring revenue from monthly management fees and hourly usage grew by 46% in 1999. In 2000 the growth was 49%. I also told you that this was a low-margin business, in which survivors will be few. Margins were indeed slim at EJA last year, in part because of the major costs we are incurring in developing our business in Europe.航空服务方面因为在欧洲的扩张而使利润变小,但增长和优势是明显的.
Look-Through Earnings
(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests (2) Calculated on average ownership for the year (3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on most dividends it receives The other group to which I owe enormous thanks is the home-office staff. After the eight acquisitions more than doubled our worldwide workforce to about 112,000, Charlie and I went soft last year and added one more person at headquarters. (Charlie, bless him, never lets me forget Ben Franklin’s advice: "A small leak can sink a great ship.") Now we have 13.8 people.伯克希尔公司总部的后勤支持人员居然不到14人,与其经营管理的巨大财富相比,这是个惊人的事实,反映了无时不在的成本控制能力和水平. On November 23, 1999, I received a one-page fax from Bruce Cort that appended a Washington Post article describing an aborted buyout of CORT Business Services. Despite his name, Bruce has no connection with CORT. Rather, he is an airplane broker who had sold Berkshire a jet in 1986 and who, before the fax, had not been in touch with me for about ten years. I knew nothing about CORT, but I immediately printed out its SEC filings and liked what I saw. That same day I told Bruce I had a possible interest and asked him to arrange a meeting with Paul Arnold, CORT’s CEO. Paul and I got together on November 29, and I knew at once that we had the right ingredients for a purchase: a fine though unglamorous business, an outstanding manager, and a price (going by that on the failed deal) that made sense. Operating out of 117 showrooms, CORT is the national leader in "rent-to-rent" furniture, primarily used in offices but also by temporary occupants of apartments. This business, it should be noted, has no similarity to "rent-to-own" operations, which usually involve the sale of home furnishings and electronics to people having limited income and poor credit. We quickly purchased CORT for Wesco, our 80%-owned subsidiary, paying about $386 million in cash. You will find more details about CORT’s operations in Wesco’s 1999 and 2000 annual reports. Both Charlie and I enjoy working with Paul, and CORT looks like a good bet to beat our original expectations. Early last year, Ron Ferguson of General Re put me in contact with Bob Berry, whose family had owned U.S. Liability for 49 years. This insurer, along with two sister companies, is a medium-sized, highly-respected writer of unusual risks ¾ "excess and surplus lines" in insurance jargon. After Bob and I got in touch, we agreed by phone on a half-stock, half-cash deal. In recent years, Tom Nerney has managed the operation for the Berry family and has achieved a rare combination of excellent growth and unusual profitability. Tom is a powerhouse in other ways as well. In addition to having four adopted children (two from Russia), he has an extended family: the Philadelphia Belles, a young-teen girls basketball team that Tom coaches. The team had a 62-4 record last year and finished second in the AAU national tournament. Few property-casualty companies are outstanding businesses. We have far more than our share, and U.S. Liability adds luster to the collection. Ben Bridge Jeweler was another purchase we made by phone, prior to any face-to-face meeting between me and the management. Ed Bridge, who with his cousin, Jon, manages this 65-store West Coast retailer, is a friend of Barnett Helzberg, from whom we bought Helzberg Diamonds in 1995. Upon learning that the Bridge family proposed to sell its company, Barnett gave Berkshire a strong recommendation. Ed then called and explained his business to me, also sending some figures, and we made a deal, again half for cash and half for stock. Ed and Jon are fourth generation owner-managers of a business started 89 years ago in Seattle. Both the business and the family ¾ including Herb and Bob, the fathers of Jon and Ed ¾ enjoy extraordinary reputations. Same-store sales have increased by 9%, 11%, 13%, 10%, 12%, 21% and 7% over the past seven years, a truly remarkable record. It was vital to the family that the company operate in the future as in the past. No one wanted another jewelry chain to come in and decimate the organization with ideas about synergy and cost saving (which, though they would never work, were certain to be tried). In July we acquired Justin Industries, the leading maker of Western boots ¾ including the Justin, Tony Lama, Nocona, and Chippewa brands ¾ and the premier producer of brick in Texas and five neighboring states. John Justin loved Justin Industries but had been forced to retire because of severe health problems (which sadly led to his death in late February). John was a class act ¾ as a citizen, businessman and human being. Fortunately, he had groomed two outstanding managers, Harrold Melton at Acme and Randy Watson at Justin Boot, each of whom runs his company autonomously. Acme, the larger of the two operations, produces more than one billion bricks per year at its 22 plants, about 11.7% of the industry’s national output. The brick business, however, is necessarily regional, and in its territory Acme enjoys unquestioned leadership. When Texans are asked to name a brand of brick, 75% respond Acme, compared to 16% for the runner-up. (Before our purchase, I couldn’t have named a brand of brick. Could you have?) This brand recognition is not only due to Acme’s product quality, but also reflects many decades of extraordinary community service by both the company and John Justin. I can’t resist pointing out that Berkshire ¾ whose top management has long been mired in the 19th century ¾ is now one of the very few authentic "clicks-and-bricks" businesses around. We went into 2000 with GEICO doing significant business on the Internet, and then we added Acme. You can bet this move by Berkshire is making them sweat in Silicon Valley. In June, Bob Shaw, CEO of Shaw Industries, the world’s largest carpet manufacturer, came to see me with his partner, Julian Saul, and the CEO of a second company with which Shaw was mulling a merger. The potential partner, however, faced huge asbestos liabilities from past activities, and any deal depended on these being eliminated through insurance. The executives visiting me wanted Berkshire to provide a policy that would pay all future asbestos costs. I explained that though we could write an exceptionally large policy ¾ far larger than any other insurer would ever think of offering ¾ we would never issue a policy that lacked a cap. Bob and Julian decided that if we didn’t want to bet the ranch on the extent of the acquiree’s liability, neither did they. So their deal died. But my interest in Shaw was sparked, and a few months later Charlie and I met with Bob to work out a purchase by Berkshire. A key feature of the deal was that both Bob and Julian were to continue owning at least 5% of Shaw. This leaves us associated with the best in the business as shown by Bob and Julian’s record: Each built a large, successful carpet business before joining forces in 1998. Shaw has annual sales of about $4 billion, and we own 87.3% of the company. Leaving aside our insurance operation, Shaw is by far our largest business. Now, if people walk all over us, we won’t mind. In July, Bob Mundheim, a director of Benjamin Moore Paint, called to ask if Berkshire might be interested in acquiring it. I knew Bob from Salomon, where he was general counsel during some difficult times, and held him in very high regard. So my answer was "Tell me more." In late August, Charlie and I met with Richard Roob and Yvan Dupuy, past and present CEOs of Benjamin Moore. We liked them; we liked the business; and we made a $1 billion cash offer on the spot. In October, their board approved the transaction, and we completed it in December. Benjamin Moore has been making paint for 117 years and has thousands of independent dealers that are a vital asset to its business. Make sure you specify our product for your next paint job. Finally, in late December, we agreed to buy Johns Manville Corp. for about $1.8 billion. This company’s incredible odyssey over the last few decades ¾ too multifaceted to be chronicled here ¾ was shaped by its long history as a manufacturer of asbestos products. The much-publicized health problems that affected many people exposed to asbestos led to JM’s declaring bankruptcy in 1982. Subsequently, the bankruptcy court established a trust for victims, the major asset of which was a controlling interest in JM. The trust, which sensibly wanted to diversify its assets, agreed last June to sell the business to an LBO buyer. In the end, though, the LBO group was unable to obtain financing. Consequently, the deal was called off on Friday, December 8th. The following Monday, Charlie and I called Bob Felise, chairman of the trust, and made an all-cash offer with no financing contingencies. The next day the trustees voted tentatively to accept our offer, and a week later we signed a contract. JM is the nation’s leading producer of commercial and industrial insulation and also has major positions in roofing systems and a variety of engineered products. The company’s sales exceed $2 billion and the business has earned good, if cyclical, returns. Jerry Henry, JM’s CEO, had announced his retirement plans a year ago, but I’m happy to report that Charlie and I have convinced him to stick around. * * * * * * * * * * * * Two economic factors probably contributed to the rush of acquisition activity we experienced last year. First, many managers and owners foresaw near-term slowdowns in their businesses ¾ and, in fact, we purchased several companies whose earnings will almost certainly decline this year from peaks they reached in 1999 or 2000. The declines make no difference to us, given that we expect all of our businesses to now and then have ups and downs. (Only in the sales presentations of investment banks do earnings move forever upward.) We don’t care about the bumps; what matters are the overall results. But the decisions of other people are sometimes affected by the near-term outlook, which can both spur sellers and temper the enthusiasm of purchasers who might otherwise compete with us. A second factor that helped us in 2000 was that the market for junk bonds dried up as the year progressed. In the two preceding years, junk bond purchasers had relaxed their standards, buying the obligations of ever-weaker issuers at inappropriate prices. The effects of this laxity were felt last year in a ballooning of defaults. In this environment, "financial" buyers of businesses ¾ those who wish to buy using only a sliver of equity ¾ became unable to borrow all they thought they needed. What they could still borrow, moreover, came at a high price. Consequently, LBO operators became less aggressive in their bidding when businesses came up for sale last year. Because we analyze purchases on an all-equity basis, our evaluations did not change, which means we became considerably more competitive. Aside from the economic factors that benefited us, we now enjoy a major and growing advantage in making acquisitions in that we are often the buyer of choice for the seller. That fact, of course, doesn’t assure a deal ¾ sellers have to like our price, and we have to like their business and management ¾ but it does help. We find it meaningful when an owner cares about whom he sells to. We like to do business with someone who loves his company, not just the money that a sale will bring him (though we certainly understand why he likes that as well). When this emotional attachment exists, it signals that important qualities will likely be found within the business: honest accounting, pride of product, respect for customers, and a loyal group of associates having a strong sense of direction. The reverse is apt to be true, also. When an owner auctions off his business, exhibiting a total lack of interest in what follows, you will frequently find that it has been dressed up for sale, particularly when the seller is a "financial owner." And if owners behave with little regard for their business and its people, their conduct will often contaminate attitudes and practices throughout the company. When a business masterpiece has been created by a lifetime ¾ or several lifetimes ¾ of unstinting care and exceptional talent, it should be important to the owner what corporation is entrusted to carry on its history. Charlie and I believe Berkshire provides an almost unique home. We take our obligations to the people who created a business very seriously, and Berkshire’s ownership structure ensures that we can fulfill our promises. When we tell John Justin that his business will remain headquartered in Fort Worth, or assure the Bridge family that its operation will not be merged with another jeweler, these sellers can take those promises to the bank. How much better it is for the "painter" of a business Rembrandt to personally select its permanent home than to have a trust officer or uninterested heirs auction it off. Throughout the years we have had great experiences with those who recognize that truth and apply it to their business creations. We’ll leave the auctions to others.
Berkshires Major Investees
Berkshires Approximate
Ownership at Yearend(1)Berkshires Share of Undistributed
Operating Earnings (in millions)(2)
American Express Company
11.4%
$265
The Coca-Cola Company
8.1%
160
Freddie Mac
0.3%
106
The Gillette Company
9.1%
51
M&T Bank
7.2%
23
The Washington Post Company
18.3%
18
Wells Fargo & Company
3.2%
117
Berkshires share of undistributed earnings of major investees
740
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(3)
(104)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire
1,779
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire
$ 2,415
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